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THE EPISTEMIC FUNCTION OF FUSING EQUAL
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS
Deborah Hellman*
ABSTRACT
The fusion of equal protection and due process has attracted significant attention
with scholars offering varied accounts of its purpose and function. Some see the com-
bination as productive, creating a constitutional violation that neither clause would
generate alone. Others see the combination as merely strategic, offered to make a
claim acceptable at a particular historical moment but not genuinely necessary. This
Article offers a third alternative. Judges have and should bring both equal protection
and due process together to learn what each clause independently requires. On this
Epistemic vision of constitutional fusion, a focus on equality helps judges learn what
rights are truly fundamental, and a focus on who lacks fundamental liberties helps
judges learn which groups need the special protection of heightened review under the
Equal Protection Clause.
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INTRODUCTION
Sometimes two or more clauses of the Constitution are brought together in the
analysis of a constitutional claim. Among examples of this phenomenon, the fusion
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of equal protection and due process is perhaps the most common, fertile and influen-
tial.1 Think Obergefell v. Hodges and Lawrence v. Texas for fairly recent examples.2
But what exactly is going on when these two clauses are brought together? Theories
abound. While there are many ways to divide up the theoretical terrain, one fruitful
way is to divide it between those views that see constitutional fusion as productive
and those that do not. In the first camp are those who think the relationship produces
a constitutional violation that each clause on its own would not; this approach includes
(at least) two variants. First, the combination may work via straight addition—a par-
tial equal protection claim combined with a partial due process claim may yield a
full Fourteenth Amendment violation.3 The second variant sees the more appropriate
mathematical metaphor as multiplication rather than addition. The combination itself
may be dynamic such that the fusion leads to a synergy between the clauses producing
a constitutional wrong that is larger than the sum of its equality-based and liberty-
based parts.4 Alternatively, perhaps the combination of clauses is strategic rather
1 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
2 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
3 See, e.g., Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1067, 1092 (2016) (providing an account of the several ways in which constitutional clauses
can be combined including “mathematically”); David L. Faigman, Measuring Constitution-
ality Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 772–78 (1994) (arguing in favor of aggregating
constitutional rights). This additive conception of the manner in which the clauses can be
combined is explicitly rejected by Kerry Abrams and Brandon L. Garrett. See Kerry Abrams
& Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1314 (2017)
(arguing that so-called “hybrid rights” in which there is no intersectional synergy should be
denied because “two half violations do not make a whole”).
4 See, e.g., Abrams & Garrett, supra note 3, at 1314 (describing three ways in which con-
stitutional clauses can be brought together including what they term “aggregate,” “hybrid”
and “intersectional” where the “intersectional” version describes a synergy between the
clauses); Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002) (“[T]his essay suggests that sometimes
looking at an issue stereoscopically—through the lenses of both the due process clause and
the equal protection clause—can have synergistic effects, producing results that neither
clause might reach by itself.”); Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups
and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 103–06 (2007) (arguing that the fusion
of liberty and equality values in Fourteenth Amendment cases is longstanding); Laurence H.
Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 17 (2015) [hereinafter
Tribe, Equal Dignity] (describing Obergefell as creating a doctrine of equal dignity in which
Justice Kennedy combined due process and equal protection); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence
v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1894, 1898 (2004) [hereinafter Tribe, The Fundamental Right] (describing the history of
Fourteenth Amendment cases as “a narrative in which due process and equal protection, far
from having separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked
in a legal double helix”); Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges,
129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 148 (2015) (arguing that Obergefell v. Hodges was a “game changer
for substantive due process jurisprudence”); Timothy Zick, Rights Dynamism, 19 U. PA. J.
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than genuine. In an era when a particular due process–based right is not, or not yet,
recognized, equal protection may be useful. Or, in an era when discrimination against
a marginalized group is not, or not yet, recognized as requiring heightened review,
due process can be useful.5 On this view, we bring equal protection–based and due
process–based claims together for pragmatic reasons only; this practice constitutes
a way station to a time when courts recognize what equal protection or due process
really or fully protect.6
I will call these two ways of understanding the relationship between the clauses
“Authentic” and “Pragmatic” which capture these two ideas. Each of these ways of un-
derstanding the relationship between equal protection and due process has been recog-
nized and elaborated on by other scholars. In fact, the combining of constitutional
clauses more generally has attracted significant attention of late with different scholars
giving different names to this phenomenon,7 and dividing the phenomenon in varied
ways.8 My goal in this Article is not to add to this already crowded field with yet
another term for the phenomenon of bringing two or more constitutional clauses to
bear (though I do think “fusion” is an apt term), nor to contribute yet another topogra-
phy of subtypes (though I do provide something along these lines). Rather, this Ar-
ticle contributes to this field by identifying and describing a heretofore unrecognized
reason for fusing constitutional clauses. When judges are uncertain about what each
individual clause actually requires, they can—and perhaps should—use the perspective
of another clause to gain insight about what the first clause genuinely requires.
CONST. L. 791, 811–17 (2017) (using the example of the synergy between equal protection
and due process as one of the examples of the rights dynamism he describes).
5 See Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1556–58
(2002) (describing how a recognition of a liberty interest can be used to protect the equality of
some groups); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Rela-
tionship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1176–78 (1988);
Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage,
2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 30 (“Lawrence’s words sound in due process, but much of its music
involves equal protection.”).
6 See Brown, supra note 5, at 1556–58.
7 See, e.g., Abrams & Garrett, supra note 3, at 1331 (“intersectional rights”); Coenen, supra
note 3, at 1075–76 (“combination arguments”); Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional
Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 463 (2010) (“constitutional borrowing” (emphasis omitted));
Zick, supra note 4, at 802 (“Rights Dynamism”).
8 See, e.g., Abrams & Garrett, supra note 3, at 1354 (describing three different ways that
constitutional clauses can be brought together: “aggregate harm” cases, “hybrid rights” cases and
“intersectional rights” cases); Coenen, supra note 3, at 1077–91 (describing types of “combina-
tion analysis” as “right/right,” “right/no-power,” “power/power” or “subclausal”); Tebbe & Tsai,
supra note 7, at 463 (describing an example of “constitutional borrowing” as “when a court
is faced with two arguments—say, a due process claim and an equal protection claim—and
chooses to endorse the former while drawing language from decisions associated with the latter”
(emphasis omitted)); Zick, supra note 4, at 811–17 (describing different types of dynamic
connections between due process and equal protection).
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The Epistemic vision of constitutional fusion is distinct from both the Authentic
view and the Pragmatic view. According to the Authentic view, combining the clauses
produces real results—via addition, multiplication or some other operation—that each
clause on its own would not.9 According to the Pragmatic view, only one clause is
needed to establish a constitutional violation on the best understanding of what each
clause entails.10 Nonetheless, the combination is rhetorically or practically useful in
getting actual judges or Justices to see the constitutionally correct result.11 The
Epistemic account is located on a different vector. It sees the combination not in terms
of whether the product is genuine or strategic but instead in terms of whether it helps
us to better understand what the Constitution requires. According to the Epistemic view,
when we are unsure whether each clause on its own would ground a constitutional
violation, combining the clauses provides insight. For this reason, and distinctively,
the Epistemic view is a vision of constitutional fusion that is grounded in humility.
This Article begins in Parts I and II by describing and providing examples of
both the Authentic and Pragmatic visions of the fusion of equal protection and due
process. Part III is the heart of the Article and provides my contribution to this litera-
ture. There I describe and illustrate the Epistemic vision of constitutional fusion. I
explore the history from which this approach emerges and describe passages from
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges in which this vision is clearest.12
I then turn from the descriptive to the normative and sketch, albeit briefly, an argu-
ment for how each clause might teach us what the other entails.
I. THE AUTHENTIC VISION OF CONSTITUTIONAL FUSION
The Authentic vision of the fusion of equal protection and due process rests on
the claim that bringing two constitutional clauses together produces rights violations
that each clause alone could not.13 This approach has (at least) two variants. According
to the additive variant, a partial equal protection claim combined with a partial due
process claim yield a complete Fourteenth Amendment claim.14 One-half plus one-
half equals one. Alternatively, some scholars see the relationship as one of synergy—
the two constitutional clauses interrelate in a manner that produces a Fourteenth
Amendment violation that is more than the sum of its parts.15
9 See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
10 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
11 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
12 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
13 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14 Coenen, supra note 3, at 1092 (arguing that “[c]ombination arguments can be modeled
mathematically”); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1425–29 (2010) (defending the right of same-sex couples to marry
on the ground that the combination of liberty and equal rights found in the fundamental interest
strand of equal protection doctrine requires equal access to important governmental benefits).
15 Karlan, supra note 4, at 474 (describing the “stereoscopic” vision that looking with both
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Consider first the additive approach. While it has a mathematical appeal, it also
seems problematic. How could it be, one might wonder, that “two losers equals one
winner”?16 Isn’t bupkis plus bupkis still bupkis—as my grandfather would say?17
Michael Coenen defends the additive approach against this charge.18 In his view,
there is a better analogy: “Just as my limited desire to see a movie and my limited de-
sire to buy clothes might together yield an overwhelming desire to go to the mall,
so too might clauses providing limited individual support for a judicial result operate
together to generate strong collective support for that result.”19
I do not aim to adjudicate whether Coenen is right that the interests protected
by equal protection and due process can be summed in the manner he suggests to
produce a genuine constitutionally protected right or not. Rather the point is to illus-
trate why one might bring two constitutional clauses to bear. The additive approach
is one way in which this fusion produces an authentic result.
The second and more prevalent way of understanding why courts fuse equal
protection and due process is that the fusion produces a synergy.20 This view has
several defenders using different terms to capture the productive combination. Pamela
Karlan’s “stereoscopic vision,”21 Laurence Tribe’s “equal dignity,”22 Kenji Yoshino’s
“antisubordination liberty,”23 and Kerry Abrams and Brandon Garrett’s “intersec-
tionality”24 each refer to a combination that yields a constitutional violation through
the dynamic combination of constitutional values.25 Karlan’s metaphor is perhaps
the most vivid:
Like the two hands that emerge from the sheet of paper to draw
one another in M.C. Escher’s famous 1948 lithograph, Drawing
Hands, the ideas of equality and liberty expressed in the equal
protection and due process clauses each emerge from and rein-
force the other. [And thus] . . . sometimes looking at an issue
clauses produces). Abrams and Garrett’s concept of “intersectional rights” is analogous. Abrams
& Garrett, supra note 3, at 1332; see also Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 14, at 1424 (acknowl-
edging that synergy between equal protection and due process may provide further grounds
for the right to equal access to civil marriage that they identify).
16 William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus
or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 219 (1998).
17 Bupkis means “absolutely nothing.” Bupkis, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2009).
18 Coenen, supra note 3, at 1092.
19 Id.
20 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
21 Karlan, supra note 4, at 474.
22 Tribe, Equal Dignity, supra note 4, at 17.
23 Yoshino, supra note 4, at 174 (“What emerges from Lawrence and Obergefell is a vision
of liberty that I will call ‘antisubordination liberty.’”).
24 Abrams & Garrett, supra note 3, at 1330.
25 See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
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stereoscopically—through the lenses of both the due process
clause and the equal protection clause—can have synergistic ef-
fects, producing results that neither clause might reach by itself.26
The two areas of case law that best illustrate this synergistic fusion are the
fundamental interests strand of equal protection doctrine27 and the more recent gay
rights cases.28 Consider, for example, M.L.B. v. S.L.J.29 There the Supreme Court
held that a person facing termination of parental rights is entitled to a waiver of the
fees required to obtain the trial transcript necessary to mount an appeal to a denial
of parental rights.30 This is a case where constitutional fusion is productive because
there is both no right to appeal a parental termination decision and no equal protec-
tion problem with fees to access judicial process more generally.31 Rather, the lack
of a waiver of fees for poor parents faced with termination of parental rights is con-
stitutionally problematic due to the synergy between the lack of equal access and the
presence of a very important interest.32
If the fundamental interest strand of equal protection doctrine is the traditional
exemplar of the synergistic Fourteenth Amendment, the protection of dignity is the
more modern data point. Modern substantive due process is marked by an evolution
in the way in which the interest at stake is characterized; it morphs from privacy
(Griswold v. Connecticut,33 Roe v. Wade34) to autonomy (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dept. of Health,35 Planned Parenthood v. Casey36) to dignity (Lawrence v. Texas,37
26 Karlan, supra note 4, at 474.
27 See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971).
28 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 570
U.S. 744 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
29 519 U.S. 102.
30 Id. at 123–24.
31 See id. at 108–09, 124–25.
32 Karlan, supra note 4, at 482–83 (contending that “equal access was required because
the right being adjudicated in the underlying proceeding was a fundamental one”).
33 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965) (protecting the “zone of privacy” implicated by a
Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives by married couples even in the “sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms”).
34 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the “right of privacy . . . founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s de-
cision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”).
35 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing that “a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment”).
36 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (describing the Court’s prior due process cases in the following
way: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life”).
37 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (holding that “adults may choose to enter upon this [same-sex]
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Obergefell v. Hodges38). Autonomy is a liberty-based interest and thus is quite na-
turally at home in the Due Process Clause.39 What distinguishes dignity from its
predecessor autonomy is precisely the addition of an equality-based concern.40
Writing for the Court in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy asserts that the Texas law which
makes non-coital sex a crime violates the dignity of gay men and lesbians, explain-
ing “[t]he state cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making
their private sexual conduct a crime.”41 While the claim that gay people have a right
to “control their destiny” sounds in the value of autonomy and thus rests on the Due
Process Clause, the right to be free from demeaning state action sounds in equality
and rests on the Equal Protection Clause.42 Also noteworthy is the way that the
Court intertwines these concerns—fusing them here in a single sentence.43 The
concept of dignity captures both ideas. A dignified person is a person of high status
or rank whose autonomy is to be respected.44 In addition, treating another with dig-
nity rules out making the person unequal or subservient and thus requires treating
her as an equal.45
One can read Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell as also adopting the
synergistic approach to fusing equal protection and due process.46 He uses the word
“synergy” itself when discussing the relevance of Zablocki v. Redhail.47 And, Justice
Kennedy explains why the restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples violates
the Fourteenth Amendment in the following way: “The imposition of this disability
on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”48 In this passage,
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons”).
38 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (upholding right of same-sex couples to marry on the
grounds that fundamental “liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual
dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs”).
39 See id.
40 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575–76.
41 Id. at 578.
42 DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 29–31, 36 (2008) (discussing
the concept of “demeaning” in discrimination); Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimina-
tion, 102 VA. L. REV. 895, 942–44 (2016).
43 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
44 JEREMY WALDRON, Dignity and Rank, in DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 13, 30–34
(Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2012); see also Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 189–229 (2011) (discussing five concepts of dignity).
45 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150 (2010) (asserting that “[t]he argument in favor of same-sex marriage
is straightforward: if two people want to make a commitment of the marital sort, they should be
permitted to do so, and excluding one class of citizens from the benefits and dignity of that
commitment demeans them and insults their dignity”).
46 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
47 Id. at 2603 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)).
48 Id. at 2604.
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the two rights combine in a way that is dynamic, producing a violation of both due
process and equal protection together.49
To recap, according to the Authentic vision of constitutional fusion, bringing
both equal protection and due process together produces real results. This can be
accomplished via straight addition, as a partial equal protection claim and a partial due
process claim produce a complete Fourteenth Amendment violation.50 Alternatively,
some “synergy,” Karlan’s term, or “intersectionality,” Abrams and Garrett’s term, is
required to produce the desired effect.51 On this view, the combination is productive
and interactive such that at least in some instances the fusion of the clauses produces
new constitutional values that laws might infringe. The protection of “dignity”—a
word that appears three times in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence52 and nine
times in his opinion in Obergefell53—exemplifies this fusion. To be treated with dig-
nity requires both that a person is free to make important self-defining decisions and
that a person be treated as equal in status to others.54
II. THE PRAGMATIC VISION OF CONSTITUTIONAL FUSION
The Pragmatic vision sees the fusion of equal protection and due process as strate-
gic rather than genuine.55 On this view, claims rest either in due process or in equal
protection, thus in liberty or in equality.56 The reason to bring both clauses together
is merely pragmatic.57
A good example of this phenomenon is Skinner v. Oklahoma.58 In Skinner, the
Court struck down a law that provided that criminal defendants convicted of three
offenses of “moral turpitude” could be sterilized.59 Because this case came before the
49 See id.
50 Id.
51 Abrams & Garrett, supra note 3, at 1330; Karlan, supra note 4, at 474.
52 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 574–75 (2003).
53 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594–97, 2599, 2603, 2606, 2608.
54 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
55 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
56 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
57 My view of the pragmatic fusion of equal protection and due process is meaningfully dif-
ferent from what Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai identify as “corrupt” constitutional borrowing.
See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 7, at 482–84. In their view, borrowing from one constitutional do-
main and importing terms, values or ideas into another is corrupt when it “occur[s] not for the
sake of prompting a good faith reconsideration of the trajectory of the law, but instead for the
purpose of confusing observers, insulating a matter from accountability, or rendering a doctrine
unusable by practitioners.” Id. at 482. The proponent of pragmatic fusion adopts that approach
to move the law in the direction he or she believes is best while accommodating doctrinal or
practical limitations. Id.
58 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
59 Id. at 536.
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Court so soon after the rejection of the Lochner era, the Court was reluctant to recog-
nize a due process–based right to procreative liberty.60 More palatable at the time,
most likely, was the claim that the law was constitutionally infirm because the way
it distinguished between crimes that could subject a person to sterilization and those
that could not tracked crimes that poor people were more likely to commit as com-
pared to more wealthy people.61 The Court thus punted, if you will, on the issue of
whether everyone would have a right not to be sterilized and rested the invalidation of
the law on the fact that there was no good reason to treat people convicted of
embezzlement (a white-collar theft offense) differently than people convicted of
simple theft.62
One can read Obergefell v. Hodges as a Pragmatic case as well. In my view, laws
that permit only opposite sex couples to marry fail to treat gays and lesbians as equals
because they express denigration for their unions. These laws thus violate equal protec-
tion, in my view, and should be invalidated for this reason. Like many others, I do not
believe that there is a fundamental right to marry.63 If a state had never adopted mar-
riage laws at all and instead had merely allowed all couples to register for domestic
partnerships of some kind, this would, in my view, have worked no constitutional vio-
lation. Whether a state that had previously had marriage (a status infused with state
approbation and not merely recognition), could afterward revert to domestic partner-
ship for all raises a different question as this change carries meaning of its own.
Nonetheless, one might think that given that a right to marry had some case support
prior to Obergefell64 and that the Court has thus far been unwilling to recognize gays
60 See Karst, supra note 4, at 112 (explaining that “Justice Douglas had been a pallbearer
at the burial of Lochner, and surely wanted to avoid a resurrection”). Nonetheless, Karst believes
that Skinner is a good example of the “integration” of equality and liberty that he argues is
longstanding. Id. at 112–13.
61 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541–42.
62 Id. at 542.
63 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27,
42–43 (1996) (“I conclude that protection of ‘good’ intimacy, of family integrity, of close
personal relationships is at the core of the negative liberties that have been recognized by the
Court in its marriage and family privacy cases. The state need not recognize marriage to
protect these values. Rather, intimacy can be protected in those cases in which the parties
demonstrate personal commitment to a shared life. This means that substantive due process
is not violated if marriage is abolished.”). But see Gregg Strauss, The Positive Right to Marry,
102 VA. L. REV. 1691, 1741 (2016) (describing and defending a special type of positive right
that provides the power to form intimate relationships on the grounds that it is needed to
safeguard the vulnerability of intimacy).
64 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91, 94–98 (1987) (invaliding a prison regulation that pro-
vided that prisoners could marry only with the approval of the warden); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 375, 382–84 (1978) (invalidating a law that prohibited people owing child support
payments from marrying by relying on the fundamental interests strand of equal protection
doctrine); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating a Virginia law that forbade
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and lesbians as a suspect class,65 that it would make pragmatic sense to bring the
clauses together.
On this view, the fusion of equal protection and due process is a nonideal
second best. Skinner is really a due process case and Obergefell is really an equal
protection case. But if the idiosyncrasies of our constitutional doctrine and history
demand a bit of fudging, so be it.
On the surface the Authentic and Pragmatic accounts of the fusion of equal
protection and due process look remarkably similar. Where they differ is at the level
of justification. For the Authentic view, some rights actually depend on the overlap
between liberty and equality concerns.66 For the Pragmatic view, the fusion is in-
strumental only; rights are grounded either in a deprivation of liberty or a violation
of equality.67 While it is true that the state could take away both in a single act, fusing
the claims is not needed to produce a new and integrated interest.
III. THE EPISTEMIC VISION OF CONSTITUTIONAL FUSION
There is a third and underappreciated way to think about the fusion of equal
protection and due process. Perhaps the intertwining of equal protection and due
process rests in judicial humility. Don’t laugh. Or perhaps more plausibly, it should
rest in judicial humility. The justification for fusion of equal protection and due
process on this view is Epistemic in nature. Due process claims assert that a funda-
mental right has been infringed, and in order to adjudicate these claims, we need to
know what rights are truly fundamental.68 Perhaps equality-based notions can help.
Similarly, claims that assert a violation of equal protection require courts to deter-
mine if the law distinguishes among people on the basis of a suspect trait.69 But what
traits should be treated as suspect? Perhaps paying attention to who can and cannot
exercise fundamental liberties will be informative. The basic idea underlying the
Epistemic rational for fusing equal protection and due process is that the values of
equality and liberty are related in a manner that allows each to guide us as to the
meaning of the other.
marriage between whites and people of other races largely on equal protection grounds but
also noting that “[t]hese statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of
law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
65 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (invalidating an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution that forbade the provision of antidiscrimination protection for gays and lesbians
by any level of state or local government because it was not rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest).
66 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
67 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
68 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–98 (2015).
69 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
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A. The “Tradition” from Which It Emerges
The problem of delineating what rights are protected by the Due Process Clause
has a long history, and going back to the incorporation debate from the first half of
the twentieth century,70 we find two views. A judge worried about unconstrained
judicial intuitions about what rights are fundamental could conclude that the Due
Process Clause protects only those liberties listed in the Bill of Rights.71 Alterna-
tively, a judge or Justice could consult our history and traditions.72 These traditions
might matter because only those rights that others previously viewed as fundamental
really should be protected constitutionally. Or alternatively, the judge might treat
history as a repository of wisdom, much like the way that common law judges see
precedent.73 On this view, the judge or Justice tries to ascertain what liberties are truly
fundamental, using history and tradition merely as helpful guides. When Justices
assert that the “Due Process Clause . . . stands . . . on its own bottom,” they see
history and tradition in this merely advisory role.74
70 The incorporation controversy was about whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights against
the states or instead whether it required that states respect liberties that are “fundamental to . . .
ordered liberty.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010) (citation
omitted) (inquiring, in incorporation cases, “whether a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is
fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty”); NOAH FELDMAN & KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 465 (20th ed. 2019) (describing the “incorporation debate”
as focused on “the question of precisely which rights were incorporated, and how a court
could identify them”).
71 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74–75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that “history conclusively demonstrates that the language of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, taken as a whole, was thought by those responsible for its submission to the
people, and by those who opposed its submission, sufficiently explicit to guarantee that thereafter
no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections of the Bill of Rights”).
72 See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (discussing Snyder v.
Massachusetts in which Justice Cardozo argued that in order to determine whether particular
procedural protections were required by the Due Process Clause, one should ask whether they
are required by a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental” (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
73 In my view, the doctrine of stare decisis can be defended on epistemic grounds. See
generally Deborah Hellman, An Epistemic Defense of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 63 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013).
74 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 883 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (asserting that the
question of the case “is not whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms (what-
ever that right’s precise contours) applies to the States because the Amendment has been in-
corporated into the Fourteenth Amendment [but] rather, is whether the particular right asserted
by petitioners applies to the States because of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, standing on its
own bottom”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring
in judgment).
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There are pros and cons to each of these approaches. On the one hand, limiting
fundamental liberties to those listed in the Bill of Rights constrains judicial discretion
and limits the role that differences in judicial judgment plays in constitutional law.75 On
the other hand, perhaps the original list does not contain all truly fundamental liber-
ties.76 This is, after all, precisely the worry the Ninth Amendment appears designed
to address.77
The incorporation debate of the early part of the twentieth century was an
argument between those who favored total incorporation of the Bill of Rights and
those who favored what is often termed “selective incorporation”—the view that
Justices determine what rights to incorporate by asking whether the right at issue is
fundamental.78 The reasons for each view mirror the familiar virtues and vices as-
sociated with the choice between rules and standards. As Frederick Schauer ex-
plains, neither a rule nor a standard works perfectly.79 The relevant question is
whether you believe you will get fewer errors by giving less discretion to the
decision maker on the ground (here, Justices) to determine whether a right really is
fundamental, or, fewer errors by constraining judicial discretion through a rule (here,
the Bill of Rights).80 If one thinks fundamental liberties can be listed and/or distrusts
the ability of judges to discern what these liberties are, the rule-like formulation is
likely to be best.81 If one thinks fundamental liberties cannot be listed (or that it is
difficult to do so), and/or trusts the ability of judges to do a reasonable job in de-
termining what they are, the standard-like formulation is likely to be best.82
This iteration of the debate has been largely settled: selective incorporation won
out.83 When Justice Alito, writing for the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago
addressed the question whether the right to keep and bear arms acts as a limit on
state governments as well as the federal government, he did not simply refer to the
Second Amendment.84 Rather, he said that the Court “must decide whether the right
75 See, e.g., Adamson, 332 U.S. at 70 (Black, J., dissenting) (“I think that decision [Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)] and the ‘natural law’ theory of the Constitution upon which
it relies degrade the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and simultaneously appropriate
for this Court a broad power which we are not authorized by the Constitution to exercise.”).
76 Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Adamson v. California makes precisely this point.
Id. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (questioning why one “would assume that no other abuses
would reveal themselves in the course of time than those which had become manifest in 1791”).
77 The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
78 FELDMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 70, at 465–67.
79 FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 149–55 (1991).
80 Id.
81 See id. at 152.
82 See id.
83 See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
84 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010).
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to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty . . . or . . .
whether this right is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”85
While due process jurisprudence has abandoned the total incorporation ap-
proach, it has not relinquished the antinomy between the virtues and vices of judicial
constraint in defining fundamental liberties. Instead that debate has been transposed
to a new contrast: the two ways of assessing whether a liberty is fundamental that
Justice Alito referenced in the passage from McDonald quoted above.86 The Court
can ascertain whether the liberty is protected by the Due Process Clause either by
focusing on whether it is fundamental—pure and simple—or instead by asking
whether it is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”87 The first ap-
proach is that of the Fourteenth Amendment resting “on its own bottom” and requires
judges to ask directly whether the right is really, truly, as a matter of actual moral
fact, fundamental.88 The second, the history-inflected version of selective incorpora-
tion, asks whether the right is rooted in our history and tradition.89 These two
approaches replay the trade-offs between selective incorporation and total incorpora-
tion, albeit in a slightly smaller space. The true morality approach would allow
judges to identify rights that really are fundamental, even if our history has missed
them previously. After all, our history and tradition, like all histories and traditions,
may well be limited in its understanding of human needs and human flourishing. In
addition, the true morality approach allows judges to reject, as non-fundamental
rights, what our history has previously protected. The right to own guns provides a
possible example here. But this approach has problems as well. How can judges be
sure that the rights they think are fundamental are, really and truly, fundamental? We
might worry that this method of decision making offers too little judicial constraint.90
The history-inflected version of assessing fundamental liberties purports to offer
such constraint.
The point of this brief history is to show the enduring nature of the competing
values of flexibility and constraint. Fundamental liberties are not self-defining and
need elaboration, yet in a way that is guided.91 The Epistemic approach to fusing equal
protection and due process offers another method of mediating these competing
85 Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (citing Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
86 Id.
87 Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
88 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring in
judgment).
89 Justice Alito’s opinion in McDonald makes a change to prior formulations of the history
and tradition approach by emphasizing “this Nation’s history and tradition,” McDonald, 130
S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721), rather than the history and tradition of
“English-speaking peoples,” Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
90 See SCHAUER, supra note 79, at 149–55.
91 See id. at 152.
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values. The idea is that the fusion of equal protection and due process provides an
underappreciated method to guide judges and Justices tasked with determining what
rights are truly fundamental. They can follow a list articulated in 1791 (the total
incorporation approach).92 They can be guided by our history and tradition (the
history-inflected version of selective incorporation).93 Or, I argue, they can use the
value of equality to help them better understand which liberties are fundamental.
This is (one side of ) the Epistemic reason for fusing equal protection and due process.
B. The New Epistemic Rationale
As far as I can tell, the Epistemic rationale for fusing equal protection and due
process is new in Obergefell v. Hodges.94 And, thus far, it seems to have gone un-
noticed.95 The fusion of the clauses appears in the early cases, especially the funda-
mental interests strand of equal protection doctrine, as described above.96 And it
resurfaces with added oomph in Lawrence v. Texas.97 But it isn’t until Obergefell
that we see the Court justifying the fusion in epistemic terms.98 As Obergefell was
written by Justice Kennedy, who is no longer on the Court, perhaps the epistemic
strand of constitution fusion will be a blip—something that appears, recedes and
never recurs. Perhaps. But as the epistemic cast of the language is so striking—once
you notice it—and the reasons that ground it quite persuasive, it is a justification for
constitutional fusion that deserves our attention.
In this section, I will highlight the language from Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Obergefell v. Hodges that explicitly appeals to this justification. I do not intend to
suggest that this is the only rationale for fusion offered in that opinion. Indeed, I
92 FELDMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 70, at 466–67.
93 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21.
94 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594–602 (2015).
95 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel. Iowa, 915 N.W.2d
206 (Iowa 2018) (invalidating an Iowa law that required a 72-hour waiting period after the
initial consultation in order to obtain an abortion as in conflict with the Iowa Constitution’s
due process and equal protection clauses). In Reynolds, the Iowa Supreme Court first held
that the law violated the Iowa Constitution’s Due Process Clause (which that court understood
as protecting the fundamental right to chose to abort via strict scrutiny rather than the undue
burden standard). Id. at 212. That court then went on to consider the Iowa Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause was also violated. Id. at 213. In doing so, the Iowa Supreme Court
said the following: “Although not required, [equal protection] can serve to cast a greater light
of understanding on a divisive issue in society.” Id. at 244 (citing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at
2602–05). While the analysis uses epistemic language—equal protection can “cast a greater light
of understanding”—the Court does not do anything with this approach in its actual analysis. Id.
96 See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110–14, 120–28 (1996); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 539–42 (1942).
97 See 539 U.S. 558, 564–67 (2003).
98 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598, 2600–04.
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earlier described the ways in which this opinion offers support for both the Authentic
and Pragmatic rationales. My point is that there is a thus-far unnoticed third reason
to combine these clauses. The passages I quote below are familiar ones. Indeed, they
are ones I have quoted before in prior work but not previously fully appreciated.99
Consider first this passage from Obergefell: “Rights implicit in liberty and rights
secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always
coextensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and
reach of the other.”100 Here, Justice Kennedy asserts that liberty-based rights and
equality-based rights are grounded in different values.101 Sometimes they overlap
(like the two lenses of Karlan’s stereoscopic vision)102 and sometimes they do not.
Justice Kennedy doesn’t make clear whether he believes that protection for same-sex
marriage resides in the area of overlap or not.103 Instead, and here’s the key point,
he asserts: each is “instructive” of what the other means and protects.104 Each right
helps to teach judges about what the other entails.105
Consider another passage: “Each concept—liberty and equal protection—leads
to a stronger understanding of the other.”106 The emphasis in this passage, as in the
prior one, is on learning and understanding, on what equality teaches us about liberty
and vice versa.107
I had read these passages before and not noticed their epistemic emphasis. Yet
now, it seems so obviously present that I am amazed I missed it before. For that, I
thank Professor Tim Zick and William & Mary Law School for inviting me and
offering me the opportunity to think more deeply about the nature of the relationship
between these two clauses.
C. How Equality Helps Us Learn Which Rights Are Fundamental
In this Section and the next, I explore why one might think that fusing equal
protection and due process has epistemic benefits. In this Section, I explore why we
might lean on equality to learn about what rights are fundamental. In the next section,
I consider how a focus on fundamental liberties helps us determine what groups
need the special solicitude that heightened review provides.
99 Hellman, supra note 42, at 949.
100 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603 (emphasis added).
101 Id.
102 Karlan, supra note 4, at 474.
103 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–04.
104 Id. at 2603.
105 Id.
106 Id. (emphasis added) Justice Kennedy also says the following: “This interrelation of
the two principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become.” Id.
107 Id.
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The arc of the argument is familiar. It has its roots in the moral intuition that
underlies the Golden Rule,108 Kant’s “categorical imperative,”109 and Rawls’ “veil
of ignorance.”110 When we are unsure whether there is a fundamental right to X,
whatever X is, we can test out the hypothesis that there is no such right by denying
to everyone the freedom to X. If we would balk at the idea, then perhaps such a right
really is fundamental. This is also the idea that animates Justice Jackson’s concur-
rence in Railway Express Agency v. New York.111 There he writes: “[T]here is no
more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government
than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon the
minority must be imposed generally.”112 Justice O’Connor, drawing on Jackson’s
approach, makes a similar argument in her concurring opinion in Lawrence.113 She
favored invalidating the law at issue on equal protection rather than due process
grounds because the Texas law at issue—unlike the law in Bowers v. Hardwick114—
applied only to same-sex couples.115 In Justice O’Connor’s view, equal application
would protect freedom of action for all because a law that prohibited non-coital sex
between both opposite sex and same sex couples would “not long stand.”116
Justice O’Connor’s approach in Lawrence has been criticized; if a sex-neutral
law were unenforced, it would stigmatize gays and lesbians while not affecting
straight couples.117 And, if it were enforced, it would affect gays and lesbians in a
more significant manner than heterosexuals.118 I agree with both of these critiques.
108 The so-called “Golden Rule” instructs that we should do unto others as we would have
them do unto us. Matthew 7:12.
109 There are several formulations of Kant’s categorial imperative but the basic idea is this:
To act morally, one should act in ways that one can generalize. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT,
GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS: ON A SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE BECAUSE OF
PHILANTHROPIC CONCERNS 30 (James W. Ellington trans., 3d ed. 1993) (1785) (explaining
that “there is only one categorical imperative and it is this: Act only according to that maxim
whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”).
110 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971) (explaining that those prin-
ciples that people would adopt in the hypothetical situation in which they do not know who
they are in society—rich or poor, male or female, sick or healthy, etc.—are those that are just).
111 336 U.S. 106, 111–17 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
112 Id. at 112.
113 539 U.S. 558, 584–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
114 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187–88, 190–91 (1986) (upholding a Georgia law
that prohibited non-coital sex between any two adults).
115 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
116 Id. at 584–85.
117 Tribe, The Fundamental Right, supra note 4, at 1910 (explaining that “[l]ike the fabled
Sword of Damocles that does its awful work not by beheading its victim but simply by dangling
above its victim’s neck, even a sex-neutral ban on sodomy, especially one blessed by the
Court, demeans intimate homosexual relationships at the same time that its virtually complete
nonenforcement greatly reduces the incentive of heterosexuals, who are not demeaned by
such a ban, to agitate for its repeal”).
118 Brown, supra note 5, at 1498 (emphasizing that “laws that provide that ‘no one may
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My point here is to emphasize how the equality orientation operates when called
upon to inform liberty. It operates like this description of such fusion in Loving v.
Virginia by Justice Kennedy: “The reasons why marriage is a fundamental right
became more clear and compelling from a full awareness and understanding of the
hurt that resulted from laws barring interracial unions.”119 Justice O’Connor herself
did not adopt the Epistemic approach to constitutional fusion that I am describing.120
Nonetheless, the use she hoped to put equality to has its roots in the dynamic I
emphasize here—with one important difference121
Both Justices Jackson and O’Connor want to use equality in a very practical
manner.122 They want to insist that the law apply to all.123 For the philosophers (Kant
and Rawls), the method is hypothetical.124 We imagine living without the liberty at
issue. How would that feel? There is good reason for this move. In the real world,
people are affected by things in different ways due to differences among them. The
imaginative exercise helps to bridge these divides by inviting us to put ourselves in
another’s shoes. If we do not know whether we are gay or straight, would we find
the right to engage in non-coital sex to be a fundamental liberty? It is this imagina-
tive, hypothetical exercise that the Epistemic approach draws upon. In this way,
equality helps to show us what liberty entails.
D. How Liberty Helps Us Learn Which Traits Require Heightened Review
In an analogous fashion, liberty can show us what equality demands. There are
two steps to this argument. First, I argue that we need help knowing what equal
treatment requires in much the same way that we need help knowing what rights are
truly fundamental. Second, I show how attention to who lacks access to fundamental
liberties in the real world can show us which groups require the special solicitation
provided by heightened review under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause demands that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any
person . . . the equal protection of the laws.”125 This text creates an enduring puzzle.
[blank]’ can exploit difference as effectively as a classification, when the blank is an activity
that ‘we,’ the political ins, have no wish to do, but that ‘they,’ the outs, claim a profound need
to do in pursuit of personal fulfillment”).
119 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
120 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584–85 (O’Connor, J. concurring in judgment).
121 Id.
122 See id. at 585(“The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today,
that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government
than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority be im-
posed generally.” (quoting Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring))).
123 Id.
124 See generally KANT, supra note 109; RAWLS, supra note 110.
125 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Laws and policies distinguish among people all the time, on the basis of all sorts of
traits. When does such distinction-drawing violate equal protection? There is no
easy answer to this question. The historical circumstance of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment suggests that distinctions that disadvantage African Ameri-
cans are especially constitutionally problematic, but beyond this fixed point, neither
the text nor the history provide much guidance.126 In addition, laws that ostensibly
treat everyone the same affect people in different ways. Does this disparate impact
also violate equal protection? These are difficult questions, made pressing by the
fact that it is implausible to suggest that all laws that distinguish among people
conflict with equal protection. To operationalize the Clause, the Court has created
doctrine. According to current equal protection doctrine, some of these laws are
subject to heightened judicial review. Which ones depends on whether the trait used
to distinguish between people is a “suspect trait” like race, sex, and a few others, or,
in cases where the law affects groups of people defined by these suspect traits in a
disparate way, whether this impact is specifically intended.
We might wonder if this doctrine does a good job of capturing which laws fail
to treat people as equals. But let’s take the doctrine we have as given. Still, new
questions will arise. Should another trait be added to the list of suspect or quasi-
suspect traits? Suppose judges and Justices, inspired by the humility that animates
the Epistemic vision of the fusion of equal protection and due process, were to use
that approach to better understand what the Equal Protection Clause requires. In
order to do so, they would use the perspective of due process to better understand
the demands of equal protection—just as one can use equality to better understand
what liberties due process protects.
What would such an approach look like in practice? The judge would look out
at our society and see if there are people who cannot, for whatever reasons, consis-
tently and comfortably exercise their fundamental rights. If so, these groups are the
ones in need of the protection of the Equal Protection Clause. That is the basic idea.
Let me illustrate. The Court has recognized fundamental rights to speech127 and
to procreative liberty,128 among others. And the Court has elaborated on the scope
of these rights. The First Amendment right to “freedom of speech” includes the right
to spend an unlimited amount of money to advocate for a candidate or cause and
includes the right to make contributions to a political candidate within a specified
limit.129 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes the right to
abort a previable fetus.130 In the case of both these rights, and likely others, differences
126 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
127 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
128 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973).
129 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (holding that giving and spending money in
connection with elections is protected speech under the First Amendment).
130 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (upholding the
“central holding” of Roe); Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (holding that a woman has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in deciding whether to terminate her pregnancy).
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in wealth affect a person’s ability to exercise these rights. Poor people are likely to
be unable to make political donations. Poor people are likely to be unable to pay for
abortions. While the poor have these rights in the abstract, they lack the ability to
exercise these rights in any meaningful sense.
Is this of constitutional concern? In the case of the right to choose abortion, the
Court has specifically addressed the question whether poor people must be given
funds to access abortion, at least when the government is funding childbirth, and has
answered that question with an emphatic “no.”131
But this is not the only relevant question. The epistemic approach uses liberty
to better understand what equal protection requires. It thus inverts the question that
the Court considered in the abortion funding cases. The abortion-funding cases ask
whether the fact that something is a fundamental right entails that the government
must provide the means to exercise it.132 I envision the Court asking whether the fact
that people can be too poor to exercise those liberties that are already recognized as
fundamental suggests that poverty (or extreme poverty) ought to be viewed as a
suspect class. I think there is a good argument for concluding “yes.” If one is too
poor to exercise fundamental liberties, then one is not a person of equal status within
the community.133 In truth, what could be clearer than that.134
Of course, designating the extreme poor as a suspect class might not be that
meaningful or valuable. There are few—perhaps no—laws and policies that explic-
itly treat people differently on the basis of the status of being poor. But the line
between disparate treatment and disparate impact is especially porous when applied
to poverty. Indeed, in many cases in which the Court examined whether it is permissible
131 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302, 318 (1980) (upholding regulations forbidding
federal payment for medically necessary abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)
(upholding a regulation providing Medicaid benefits for childbirth but not for medically un-
necessary abortion).
132 In the context of some fundamental rights, the Supreme Court has answered that question
in the affirmative. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to state funded counsel in a criminal case
if a person is too poor to pay for a lawyer himself). Interestingly, some constitutionally pro-
tected rights include within their ambit protection for the right to spend one’s own money to
exercise them and some do not. See Deborah Hellman, Money and Rights, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 527, 528 (2011) (describing which rights include the right to spend money in
connection with their exercise and which do not and offering a potential explanatory rationale).
133 My claim is substantially more modest than the claim of G. A. Cohen who argues that
people who are too poor to exercise rights lack those rights, not merely the ability to exercise
them. See G.A. Cohen, Freedom and Money, in ON THE CURRENCY OF EGALITARIAN JUSTICE,
AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 166–67 (Michael Otsuka ed., 2011).
134 Tarunabh Khaitan argues that discrimination law—in the U.S. and in several other
jurisdictions—protects those groups whose systematic and pervasive disadvantage limits their
freedom. See generally TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW (2015).
His account provides support for the view that we should see who lacks basic freedoms and
provide heightened review to those groups. Id.
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to charge fees for various things, like access to judicial process and voting, the Court
assessed these fees as if the statute at issue actually explicitly differentiated between
the poor and the nonpoor.135 For example, in Griffin v. Illinois, which held that a
state must provide a trial transcript to an indigent criminal defendant appealing a
conviction on nonfederal grounds, Justice Black’s plurality opinion emphasized that
“[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on
account of religion, race, or color.”136 Justice Black here treats the existence of the
fee as equivalent to disparate treatment on the basis of poverty.137 The requirement
of a fee for a trial transcript does not explicitly differentiate on the basis of wealth.138
Rather, fee requirements have a disparate impact on poor people who cannot afford
the fees.139 It is thus striking that Justice Black analogizes the disparate impact of a
fee to disparate treatment on the basis of religion, race, or color.140
This tendency to elide the distinction between disparate treatment and disparate
impact is common in the context of laws and regulations that establish fees.141 Justice
Douglas’s opinion in Douglas v. California, which held that an indigent criminal
defendant has a right to state provided counsel for the first appeal where the state
provides an appeal as of right, is similar.142 Justice Douglas explained that “where
the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as a right are decided without
benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich
and poor.”143 This is also the approach of Justice Douglas in Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections.144 The Court invalidated Virginia’s poll tax because “[l]ines drawn on
the basis of wealth or property, like those of race . . . are traditionally disfavored.”145
The fact that the statute at issue did not draw a line on the basis of wealth but instead
had a disparate impact on the basis of wealth is absent from the Court’s analysis.146
135 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
136 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 14.
139 Id. at 18–19.
140 Id. at 17.
141 E.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
142 372 U.S. at 357.
143 Id.
144 383 U.S. at 668 (striking down Virginia’s poll tax as violating the Equal Protection
Clause).
145 Id. (citation omitted).
146 See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 79 (1972) (invalidating an Oregon require-
ment that tenants post a bond of twice the rent in order to appeal an eviction and emphasizing
that “[t]he discrimination against the poor, who could pay their rent pending an appeal but
cannot post the double bond, is particularly obvious”); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235,
242 (1970) (striking down a state court judgment that required Williams to stay in jail beyond
the statutory maximum for his crime because he could not pay the fines and court costs on
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Perhaps the reason for the conflation of disparate treatment and disparate impact
in these cases dealing with fees can be explained by the fact that they are decided
prior to 1976, when the Court decided Washington v. Davis, the case that made the
distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact constitutionally
significant.147 In Washington v. Davis, the Court held that strict scrutiny does not
apply to a facially neutral law that produces a disparate impact on a protected group
absent a showing that the disparate impact was specifically intended.148 It is surely
true that prior to Washington v. Davis, the distinction between disparate treatment
and disparate impact was less important and this likely explains, at least in part, why
the fees cases treat these laws as if they contained wealth-based classifications. But,
interestingly, the 1996 case M.L.B. v. S.L.J., discussed earlier, continues that ap-
proach.149 There the Court invalidates a Mississippi statute that requires payment of
the costs of producing a record in order for a person to challenge the termination of
parental rights.150 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, does address the fact that
this law has a disparate impact form.151 Nonetheless, she asserts that laws like this
one “are not merely disproportionate in impact . . . they are wholly contingent on
one’s ability to pay . . . .”152 Thus, fees to access something may well be treated as
if the statute at issue differentiates on the basis of wealth.153
Let me recap. Using liberty to learn what groups should be afforded heightened
review, we look at the world to see who is actually unable to exercise fundamental
liberties. One group that stands out is poor people.154 This analysis suggests that
poor people should get special solicitude from equal protection doctrine. In addition,
perhaps this solicitude should operate when laws take both a disparate impact and
a disparate treatment form.155
One caveat before proceeding. I am not saying that if we imagine limiting who
may exercise a fundamental right and find that such a thing is deeply troubling, that
tells us whether differentiation on the basis of the trait that defines that group should
be problematic on equal protection grounds. If we did that, some odd results would
follow. For example, suppose only blue-eyed people were permitted to vote. That
the grounds that “a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its opera-
tion” (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 n.11 (1956))).
147 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
148 Id. at 242 (explaining that “[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the
sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing
alone, it does not trigger the rule . . . that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations”) (citation omitted).
149 See generally M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
150 Id. at 107.
151 Id. at 127.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text.
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would surely be problematic. But this does not mean that differentiation on the basis of
eye color should be subject to heightened review. Rather, the argument begins with an
observation about our world as it is. We look out at the world and ask: who is not in fact
able to exercise fundamental rights? We then use that insight to give rise to a conjecture
that such a group should be protected by our equal protection jurisprudence.
The reader may have noticed an interesting asymmetry between the way that
equality informs liberty as compared with how liberty informs equality. Equality
informs liberty by way of a hypothetical construct.156 We envision ourselves in
another’s shoes and ask how it might feel to have the rule at issue—the liberty
deprivation—applied to us.157 Equality brings us together constructively and thereby
helps us to learn what liberties are fundamental. It starts in the imagination and
projects onto the world. The way that liberty informs equality works in the other
direction.158 It begins with an observation about the facts on the ground and asks
what groups in our society are often unable to exercise fundamental liberties.159
From these observations, we learn which traits or groups should be given heightened
review under the equal protection clause.160 This approach starts in the world and
uses observations about our actual society to inform legal doctrine. In this way, the
fusing of equal protection and due process, in a method analogous to Rawls “reflec-
tive equilibrium,” moves back and forth between the real world and the theory to
form judgments informed by both.161
CONCLUSION
The two most common ways of understanding the fusion of equal protection and
due process are aptly described as Authentic and Pragmatic. I hope I have given you
a clear sense of what each of these are. I offer a third, conceptually distinct, rationale
for the fusion of equal protection and due process, which I term Epistemic. The basic
idea is this: we intertwine the clauses to help us uncover or learn about what both
due process and equal protection do (or should) protect. The more familiar version
of this phenomenon is the use of equality to learn about liberty. In order to get a better
grasp of what liberties are indeed fundamental, we imagine the scenario in which no
156 See discussion supra Section III.C.
157 See discussion supra Section III.C.
158 See discussion supra Section III.D.
159 See discussion supra Section III.D.
160 See discussion supra Section III.D.
161 RAWLS, supra note 110, at 20 (explaining how “reflective equilibrium” works by alter-
nating between the level of theory, which posits principles for the hypothetical original position,
and the level on considered judgments about what outcomes are just and that “[b]y going
back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others
withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we
shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and
yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted”).
2019] THE FUNCTION OF FUSING EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS 405
one has the freedom at issue. If this would be intolerable, then perhaps the liberty
is fundamental. I suggest that this move has its roots in familiar moral ideas about
generalizability, following Kant and Rawls.162 I then propose an inverse relation:
perhaps we can learn about what equal protection requires with the help of some
observations about fundamental liberties protected by the Due Process Clause. One
of the central puzzles of equal protection jurisprudence is to determine which traits
require heightened review: race, sex and some others. But which ones? I propose that
we might look at our society and observe which categories of people are unable to
exercise rights recognized as fundamental for insight into who might need the spe-
cial protection of equal protection jurisprudence.
This Epistemic rationale for fusing equal protection and due process is new in
Obergefell v. Hodges163 and not yet recognized by scholars as a distinct reason to
bring these clauses together. Yet, the guidance that equality provides about what
liberties are fundamental has long been recognized.164 As a focus on who lacks funda-
mental liberties can similarly inform us about what groups need the special solici-
tude of equal protection’s heightened review, the Epistemic rationale for fusing these
clauses looks worth exploring further.
162 See discussion supra Section III.C.
163 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
164 See discussion supra Section III.D.
